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ABSTRACT: Design deliberation refers to the process of thoughtfully weighing options, before making a 
design decision. This process is strongly related to argumentation, not only because of the well-known 
relation between argumentation and deliberation, but also due to characteristics of the design process. 
However, no structural model of team design deliberation exists to guide designers’ practice. This paper 
checks the hypothesis of inter-dependence between argument structures and group decision-making struc-
ture as expressed through prescribed deliberation stages. 
KEYWORDS: joint deliberation, team design, human communication, argument structure, argumentation 
sequence 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Design deliberation refers to the process of thoughtfully weighing options, before get-
ting to a design decision. This process is strongly related to argumentation, not only be-
cause of the general relation between argumentation and deliberation (Walton 1998), but 
also due to characteristics specific to the design process. First of all, as a reasoning pro-
cess, design is a form of practical reasoning, focusing on “that-which-is-not-yet” (Nel-
son & Stolterman 2003), with the aim of its realization. Maximizing this process (Simon 
1996) forms the base of deliberative reasoning, as it implies a selection among possible 
solutions, according to criteria (Walton 1990). Secondly, the ill-structured or wicked na-
ture (Rittel & Webber 1973) of most design problems renders the design solutions high-
ly ill-defined, meaning that there is not pre-determined way that leads to the (best) solu-
tion (Darses et al. 2001). Last but not least, design is a social process (Bucciarelli 1988), 
meaning that design representations are negotiated. This aspect is very important, given 
that most of the complex design is nowadays done in teams. Deliberating together with 
other people, whose opinion is considered equally important for the decision to be made, 
implies a special type of argumentation, called joint deliberation. 
 Although some conceptual models aimed at guiding the individual design prac-
tice do exist for some disciplines, team design deliberation models have not yet been 
proposed. The reasons for this lack of team-based generic models can be various. The 
most important relate to the creative aspects of design practice, which make it a highly 
iterative process (Minneman 1991), marked by a co-evolution among the problem space 
and the design space (Dorst & Cross 2001), and a continuous opportunistic jumping 
from one topic to another (McDonnel 2009). Moreover, although normative models 
have been proposed for some types of dialogue, such as persuasion (Walton & Krabbe 
1996), the same is not as much observed for deliberation, where the existing models are 
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either limited to computer agents communication, or approached through short examples 
derived from everyday conversations (for an overview of these models see Walton, 
2011). A well-known joint deliberation model is the one proposed by McBurney Hitch-
cock, & Parsons (2007). These authors explicitly state that their model is not constructed 
having humans in mind, and thus, we do not aim at testing its applicability in a “real” 
deliberation context. However, the normativity entailed in such a model is considered, in 
this article, as comparable to the followed group structure of decision. 
 The notion of structure is expansively studied in the field of small group deci-
sion-making. In this context, the “intersection of individual action and (group) structural 
factors” is an observed reality (Poole, Seibold, & McPhee 1996: 115). As Shotter (1983) 
comments, “ all human action is doubly structured, for it is structured both as a product 
and a process, or better it is both structured and structuring” (p. 19). On one hand, indi-
viduals influence with their actions the group behavior, or as Poole et al. (1996) put it, 
“communication networks exist only by virtue of members’ activities”. This, in terms of 
argumentation and joint deliberation, means that group deliberation processes are influ-
enced by individual argumentative action. On the other hand, as Meyers & Brashers 
(1999) have shown, individuals’ argument structures are mediated by collective struc-
tures developed in group interaction, such as the joint deliberation sequences.  
 In this paper, we are interested in checking the hypothesis of this mutual rela-
tionship described above, in the context of eLearning design. More precisely, our focus 
is on argument structures emerging throughout instructional designers’ interaction while 
working on a specific project, the design and development of an on-line course. After 
identifying and labelling these structures, as it will be better explained in the following 
sections, we are interested in situating them in their design deliberation context. To do 
that, we segment the interaction protocol in design rationale sequences, which subse-
quently form deliberation sequences or stages (McBurney et al. 2007). Situating argu-
ment and argumentation sequences in deliberation stages allows for observing possible 
inter-dependencies between them, which is the main goal of this paper. The aim of the 
whole research, not treated entirely here, is to mine out meaningful patterns of interac-
tion, in order to inform team collaboration practices in similar contexts.  
2. ARGUMENT AS STRUCTURE 
The notion of argument as structure is very related to the Formal Logic perspective, as 
“in the traditional view, a good argument is a valid one, and validity is a matter of form” 
(Tindale, 1999: 21). However, treating the structure of arguments appearing in everyday 
conversation only based on validity-oriented relations between claims and premises is 
not an adequate option. Everyday reasoning is very different from the formal reasoning 
(Galotti, 1989), and this difference is often expressed through cognitive biases (Tversky 
& Kahneman 1974; Perkins 1989), or enthymematic arguments (Hitchcock 1985). 
Nonetheless, even adopting an Informal Logic perspective, structure is very important at 
the time of identifying and analyzing arguments. For Walton (1982), “the core of any 
argument is a set of propositions” (p. 32), and for Plantin (1996), any proposition can be 
a conclusion, if supported by grounds, which take the status of arguments with the use of 
an adequate inference law. In one way or another, the propositional structure of informal 
arguments is something to take into account. 
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 Of course, structure itself is not a sufficient condition for deciding on the 
soundness—the informal correspondent of validity- of an everyday argument. Other cri-
teria such as relevance and acceptability (Johnson & Blair 1994) have been proposed, 
accompanied by new ways of judging the dialectical nature of arguments (Walton 1985). 
Nonetheless, the present paper only focuses on the structural aspects of both argumenta-
tion and joint deliberation. A deep analysis and evaluation on basis of informal reason-
ing criteria exceeds our goals. Given this limitation, to be “honest” at the time of identi-
fying arguments from other discursive constructs, the following macro-principle pro-
posed by Freeman (1993) is mainly followed: 
If either the truth of a premise increases the likelihood that the conclusion will be true  or 
the falsity of the premise increases the likelihood that the conclusion is false, then the prem-
ise is relevant to the conclusion. If neither of these conditions holds, then the premise is not 
relevant. (Freeman, 1993:199)  
In addition to this general rule, the following criteria of argument definition, derived 
from the relevant literature, are also respected (the examples are taken from our dataset 
protocol described later on): 
 The speaker’s intention is to support her point of view. Sometimes, apparently 
deriving conclusions are just expansions of the speaker’s hypothesis, as in the 
example below: 
 
A You know so we know there are going to be problems with Compendium 
C Yeah 
A so the guide has a sort of page saying “If you have problems with Compendium” 
 
 A valid semantic inference is not a sufficient condition for argument identifica-
tion. A non-argument of this case is the following: 
 
E … that is a group related design problem actually isn’t it? 
A What the  
E Because we are in the group level  
A Yeah 
E and we got a problem which relates or tries to relate to a  group kind of activities  
E so group things, not just personal 
 
 On the contrary, the presence of a dialectical tier (Johnson, 2000) with some 
previous statement or position sometimes is sufficient for the argument identifi-
cation, due to the frequent omission of premises in everyday conversation: 
 
D you know for example you could have a layout  
D where at the beginning of each section there’s a map 
D of sort of what you have to cover in that section 
F yeah, but be careful  




3. TYPES OF ARGUMENTS IN JOINT DESIGN DELIBERATION 
According to Walton (1998), the core of deliberative argumentation is the practical in-
ference. In this type of inference,  
the major premise is a goal premise in which the agent states that he has a particular goal to 
carry out. The second premise, called the means premise, states that, according to the 
agent’s estimate of his circumstances, such and such is a particular means of carrying out 
this goal in that situation. The conclusion states that the agent ought to select the particular 
course of action designated in the means premise as a way of proceeding. (Walton, 
1998:154) 
 Goal premise: Bringing about Sn is my goal. 
 Means Premise: In order to bring about Sn, I need to bring about Si. 
 Conclusion: Therefore, I need to bring about Si.  
In team design situations, practical inference is usually expressed as a problem-solving 
inference: 
 A is the problem. 
 B is necessary to solve the problem. 
 Therefore, it is required to bring about B. 
This type of inference is very similar to an argument from positive consequences, also 
very frequent in everyday deliberation (Walton, 1998). This inference has the following 
form: 
 If A´ is brought about, then, as a consequence, B´ will come about 
 B´ is a positive state of affairs 
 Therefore, A´ should be brought about. 
In the above scheme, A´ corresponds to an action which influences positively on the 
team’s goal. Similarly, B of the problem-solving inference, also influences positively on 
the design goal, as it reduces or eliminates a specific design problem. The difference 
among them lies in the fact that practical inference is always proposing some type of ac-
tion, whereas arguments from positive or negative consequences are more near to a val-
ue judgment. Table 1 presents examples from the analyzed corpus corresponding to each 
one of the three argument types mentioned so far. It is worth mentioning here that, given 
the fact that most of these arguments are enthymematic, their classification to one cate-
gory or another is only possible by knowing well the context of design and interaction, 
in which they took place. Still, we consider their exposition as relevant for the needs of 
this article. 
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Practical inference Positive consequences Negative consequences 
It can be quite 
wordy and chatty, 
and I’m thinking 
OK, is the style go-
ing to be less chatty, 
more block 
Whereas if people start 
getting involved early on, 
seeing the content being 
developed kind of in front 
of their eyes, then it should 
work really nicely 
Be totally behind this 
everyone needs to be to-
tally behind it because 
this isn’t cheap this is 
going to need a lot of 
money 
 
Table 1. Main deliberation argument schemes 
Other knowledge-related schemes that can emerge in a practical reasoning context, are 
the arguments from expertise or position to know, and arguments from alternatives and 
opposites (Walton, Reed, & Macagno, 2008).  Both cases seem to be very common in 
the field of team design: argument of authority forms part of a typical assessment se-
quence in co-design (Détienne et al., 2005); whereas, elaboration of alternative devel-
opments or solutions occupies the 21% of the total time spent in design review meetings 
(D’Astous et al., 2004). However, some clarifications regarding their use in the specific 
study need to be made. First of all, expertise is a very relevant term in team design, es-
pecially in the case of eLearning design, where different perspectives need to come to-
gether. Each participant is considered by herself and the others as more or less expert in 
one or more fields. Thus, automatically her point of view is taken more into considera-
tion on a specific subject than another. For this reason, expertise-seeking dialogues or 
expertise-exposing monologues are very common in the treated dataset. However, for 
the needs of this paper, only the arguments where some authority other than the speaker 
is appealed to are identified as arguments from expertise. 
 In addition to this clarification, a differentiation between arguments from exper-
tise and practical inferences needs to be made, for when a person or entity is presented 
as a solution to a problem, most of the times it is because of her expertise. In this case, 
though, the conclusion is action-oriented and not truth-oriented, as in the case of argu-
ment from expertise. Table 2 shows an example for each case. 
Argument from expertise Practical inference 
But then Hilary said to me “if you can 
spend the money in this financial year 
I’ll let you go over it” sort of thing 
Should you be buying a  
whole lot of them? 
No we’re only being allowed 1000 
 
I think as you go along, I got an ex-
cellent CTA, Mary Jones. So if we do 
it… you know as we go along and she 
can do this transferring thing hope-
fully. She’s worked in a lot of cours-
es, she knows about you know 
 
Table 2. Distinction between argument from expertise and practical inference 
Finally, attention should be paid to the argument from alternatives or opposites, and its 
two variations: the positive and the negative form. Walton et al. (2008) give the follow-
ing descriptions of the two versions of this scheme: 
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(1) The opposite (or alternative) of subject S has the property P.  
Therefore, S has the property not-P. 
OR 
(2) The opposite (or alternative) of subject S has the property not-P.  
Therefore, S has the property P 
Again, a differentiation among this type of argument and the argument from conse-
quences needs to be made. To do that, the following criterion seems adequate for the 
context of design: argument from alternatives corresponds to a specific proposal made as 
a reply to another proposal, whereas argument from consequences is one-sided, more 
general, and not derived from the comparison of two proposals. Therefore, it can be said 
that argument from alternatives is more related to the design task than argument from 
consequences, as it contributes with a concrete alternative solution. Table 3 shows two 
clarifying examples. 
Argument from alternatives Negative consequences 
You know, you’ve got this developing, it’s open to every-
body, rather than this kind of frustrating …, you know 
we’ll develop it, then we’ll give it to TLS with all these 
comments, which might be fine comments, but bloody 
hell, you’re meant to be moving on to the next thing 
now, you don’t want to have to go back and redo all this 
that’s a decision we 
need to make as a 
course team, and then 
we can work to that, 
otherwise we’ll be pro-
ducing different styles 
 
Table 3. Distinction between argument from alternatives  
and argument from consequences 
Apart from these deliberative reasoning related schemes, other everyday informal argu-
ments can occur. As such, the following are distinguished due to their relevance to the 
particular context: judgments from personal opinion, when an evaluative proposition is 
justified with another evaluative proposition; judgments from rule, when an existing or 
known domain strategy or procedure is the main premise exposed; and users-based 
judgment, when the justification of one’s viewpoint is based on users’ hypothetical be-
haviour. Table 4 presents some examples. 
Personal opinion Rule-based Users-based 
It’s quite nice to have 
that separation, some-
one’s reading it 
through and picking 
up errors, it’s just an-
other loop in the pro-
cess 
That’s a big 
problem. 
About 80% of 
our work is 
done on Macs. 
Getting them into the technology (…) because 
I  don’t know who’s been appointed, but if we 
end up with you know maybe half the people 
are kind of old lags, you know they’ll be old 
lags who are willing, but they might not be 
terribly technically competent some of them  
 
Table 4. Common inference schemes.  
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In-between practical arguments and other judgments, another form of argument is very 
close to the design process: argument from analogy. Because of its relation to creativity, 
which always refers to a “building-on” rather than a “from zero” creation, design pro-
cess is frequently based on analogical reasoning. In fact, the role of analogies in creative 
design has been extensively shown regarding the construction of new artefacts, re-
constructing existing ones (e.g. Cross, 1997; Bonnardel, 1999). The cognitive mecha-
nism behind this type of reasoning has been defined as “reuse of past design” (Détienne, 
2003), and it applies to both individual and collective design situations. In this sense, 
argument from analogy is a very explicit case where a designer communicates his past 
or relevant experience with other artefacts, which can serve as a model or example for 
the design-at-hand. Arguments from analogy have been defined with this general argu-
ment scheme (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Henkemans, 2002): 
 Y is true of Z 
 Because: Y is true for X, 
 And: X is comparable to Z 
Using the amplifications proposed by Henkemans (2002) for the term “comparable”, we 
identify this type of argument as any moment in the designers’ discourse where some 
kind of analogy, resemblance, equivalence, or parallelism to another design product or 
experience takes place, with the interest to influence the design decision-making pro-
cess. Two relevant examples are given on Table 5. 
Argument from analogy 
(product) 
Argument from analogy 
(experience) 
T189 course website, there’s 
lots of stuff up there, there’s 
reams of texts  
Yeah 
and that’s sort of a similar 
sort of thing to this  
Yeah yeah 
 
So I was thinking maybe 
we want to keep the Design 
Thinking blog going … 
cause that’s quite a good 
way and then link to that 
from the VLE 
 
 
Table 5. Two types of argument from analogy 
 
4. ARGUMENTATION AS A DISCURSIVE SEQUENCE  
The argument types-schemes mentioned in the previous section generally refer to argu-
ments emerging as part of an argumentation process, where there is a need to persuade a 
silent –but present- Other about the truth or superiority of one’s thesis. Thus, they refer to 
dialogically contextualized individual arguments. When at least two argument structures 
relate to each other in a more or less dialectical way, the result is what can be called as an 
argumentation sequence. An argumentation sequence is a type of argumentation dialogue 
emerging during natural communication that has an identifiable argumentative goal or func-
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tion per se (Patterson, 2011). Hereby, we provide some main types of argumentation dia-
logues or sequences that are possible or expected to emerge during team design deliberation. 
4.1 Exploratory argumentation 
Exploratory argumentation refers to a “basic” version of what Mercer (1996) called as 
exploratory talk or what Walton (2011) defined as discovery dialogue. As “basic”, we 
mean that participants stay at the argument or viewpoint-exchange level, without pro-
ceeding into counter-arguments and replies. It is a type of sequence in which relevant 
viewpoints are being exchanged on the same topic, but without clear objection or con-
sensus. It can be said that it is a kind of “argument-storm”, meaning a brainstorming 
composed of arguments produced by different participants. The dialectical tier between 
these arguments is not clear, which is why Goldman (1994) considers this type of argu-
mentation as a noncore case, to differentiate it from “real” argumentation. In the co-
design context, an elementary form of exploratory argumentation sequence is one where 
a constraint is expressed by one speaker, and a possible solution responding to this con-
straint is subsequently presented by another speaker. Together, they form a type of dia-
logical practical argumentation. An example of this sequence is shown on Figure 1 (in 
italics the constraint and the solution expressed). 
B but I also think it’s it’s quite easy for students to come,  
B you know they are working on their own,  
B they come into this and they go in there and sort of start getting lost,  
C Yeah 
B kind of don’t know what they’ve done and what they haven’t 
F I was going to get lost anyways  
F because the tendency is to follow that linear way  
F the way it’s presented there 
F and I wonder whether on the 6th February or the 13th February we 
need another item which says Week Two signpost or Week Two Help 
F and it’s Peter or Peter’s voice saying “This week contains a number of 
elements, you don’t have to do them in any particular order, but it’s 
important that you do the two Core Readings, this and this, try the 
assignment or look at it first but don’t forget to go back to this element 
called this”  
F and it just helps put the student at ease,  
F that week you do it that way, in Week Three Help I say “it’s important 
you do begin with the Two Readings this week” 
F and it’s just, you feel like you have your hand held  
F you could ease it away towards the end, 
F but there is something of a need for a weekly signpost,  
F bit of text, bit of video ideally 
E That would be great, yeah 
F Yeah but somehow something which helps the students navigate   
F in the WAY in which you use that resource  
 
Fig.1 Exploratory argumentation 
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4.2 Co-constructive argumentation 
Argumentation seen as a type of co-constructive interaction is very common in collabo-
rative learning environments. Design deliberation is a context where collaboration, in the 
sense of sharing and grounding knowledge and beliefs, is a desired process, if not a pre-
requisite. When the goal of argumentation is to learn mutually, argumentative behavior 
is characterized by putting forward knowledge-based arguments, and viewpoints from 
different, but complementary perspectives. Thus, two main cases of co-constructive ar-
gumentation emerge: negotiation of meanings, when participants share different 
knowledge or views about a concept; and negotiation of solutions, when participants 
propose different, and not mutually exclusive solutions for the same issue-problem, or 
approach different epistemic statuses of the same solution (Baker 1995). It is worth not-
ing here that negotiation when speaking of cognitive task-oriented interaction does not 
have conflict of interests as a condition. Moreover, as the final goal-object needs to be 
common or commonly shared, individual intentions matter less than the joint goal. 
However, difference in expertise or the so-called “cognitive asymmetry” can result in 
the two types of negotiation as co-construction mentioned above. An example is shown 
on Figure 2. 
A What I thought is the contribute site that  I’ve set up is just a way of 
quickly getting all the stuff online 
A so everyone can see it,  
A roughly in the form that students are kind of going to go through it  
A and then you,  
A you as LTS or someone else,  
A would transfer it from the contribute site to the structured content 
B That’s what I sort of envisioned.  
B But in my view the problem is that if you are talking about a lot of, if 
you’re talking about big documents, it might make the process a bit 
tricky. 
B So that’s why I would like to have a browse through  
A So () if you’ve set up this page “What is Design Thinking?” [indi-
cates with mouse],  
A ehm, which is pretty much the same as this page, you know, “What is 
design” [indicates with mouse], something like that,  
A so it’s basically a question of taking the text out 
B Copying it out of that…  
 
Fig. 2 Co-constructive argumentation 
4.3 Alternative viewpoint elaboration 
As we already mentioned, alternative viewpoint elaboration is an important activity in 
team design. The more solutions or perspectives on the same object that are proposed, the 
more approximated the “best” choice is. However, although alternatives are frequently 
expressed in design meetings (D’Astous et al. 2004), what really makes them valuable for 
the deliberation process is their elaboration and evaluation by other participants and/or 
through different perspectives. In the example presented in Figure 3, the alternative of 
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having “different voices” in the course’s material, proposed by F, is viewed as something 
positive by B, A, C, and F, but for different reasons (all of them following the “argument 
from positive sequences” scheme). The initial proposal and the arguments supporting it 
are put in italics.  
F The alternative way is we start off by saying “ok, here’s the course team",  
F well we introduce the course team different people, different personalities 
F  and then we keep those identities throughout  
F so in Nicole’s work it can have a different identity  
F you know the voice, it goes down one track,  
F Steve’s is a different way 
C Ehm, I think that is quite nice 
B Yeah I think that is a nice way  
B () might like one person’s material  
A But also you get the kind of the kind of idea of getting different voices   
A and being told, you know, being told the same thing in slight different ways   
A and yeah, I quite like that multiple…  
A and also there’s a lot of people involved in teaching you  
A rather than just kind of  
C And that relates to the OU learning styles thing doesn’t it? In a way 
A Yeah 
F It would make it easier for us to deliver   
F because we have a bit more control over what we want to do individually 
within shells that you provide  
 
Fig. 3 Alternative viewpoint elaboration 
4.4 Constraints weighing 
Constraints weighing is a sequence frequently observed in design meetings (Détienne, 
Martin, & Lavigne 2005). A large part of joint design deliberation is dedicated to as-
sessing the strengths and weaknesses of the viewpoints proposed, without proposing an 
alternative or contrary solution. As constraints are highly discipline-dependent, a con-
flict or disagreement among disciplines is possible to occur regarding the (degree of) 
consideration of a specific constraint. An elementary version of such a sequence con-
cerns the proposal of a solution or an issue consideration from one side and its direct 
“annulation” by the other side, because of a relevant constraint. In the example presented 
in Figure 4, the issue concerned by both sides is the same—writing the manual of how to 
use one of the tools proposed by the designed course—, but its approach differs: G refers 
to the need to do screenshots, and B—who is part of the responsible team for the techno-
logical solutions- comes up with a constraint: first, they have to do the visuals. 
  
ARGUMENTATION AND DESIGN DELIBERATION 
11 
G I think a concern could be about the fact that we maybe can’t write 
…how to use ODS                until we got the complete working… model  
G because it makes it () write it to some extent  
G but you know you need to be able to do screenshots  
G and show people how to do stuff and I think () 
B Screen screenshots will have to … wait  
C Yeah 
B Because… the visuals won’t be done  
B but the functionality will be there  
B I mean I mean in in fairness on on our side a lot of the functionality has 
been held up  
B by …specifying exactly what () 
G Sure 
 
Fig. 4 Constraints weighing.  
4.5 Oppositional argumentation 
Sometimes dissensus is an end itself in argumentative practice (Willard, 1989). This is very 
rarely the case in institutional contexts, especially if the goal is clearly collaborative. How-
ever, there are some cases where difference in perspective is so strong, that brings to the ex-
plicit expression of a counter-position towards another party (e.g. the team leader or the “ex-
pert”). Again, as in co-constructive negotiation, such argumentation is not as much based on 
individual interests, but rather on cognitive or disciplinary aspects considered to be conflic-
tive because of epistemic differences. Such confrontation of opposite viewpoints is generally 
considered as positive, because it serves to bringing to light non-considered aspects of the 
problem or solution discussed. Therefore, this sequence, in the specific context of co-design, 
is very similar to the alternative viewpoint elaboration. The main difference is that some 
kind of disagreement, doubt, or critisicism towards a person’s position needs to be explicitly 
expressed, with the aim of persuading the other(s) on the better quality of the contrary solu-
tion proposed, or of the greater accuracy of an evaluation made. An example is shown on Fig-
ure 5. 
B Now… it’s a  shame  
B and sounds like a duplication of work, 
B 
it would be nice  if you could do… you know if you could while you 
were writing this stuff just write it (up) in structured content, 
B but it is a bit fiddly and it is () 
C Yeah  
A Well I don’t know, I don’t know if it is duplicated  
C Yeah  
A It’s quite nice to have that  
C Separation 
A That separation,  
A someone’s reading it through and picking up errors,  
A it’s just another loop in the process 
A It picks up stuff that needs doing  
 
Fig. 5 Oppositional argumentation 
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4.6 Oppositional with reply 
If opposition is difficult to express, in the context of institutional co-design, reply in re-
sponse to such opposition is even more rare and difficult. In a purely dialectical situa-
tion, with clear disagreement involved, refutation is a common strategy and also very 
welcome and accepted. Again, when the common goal is the co-construction of a highly 
complex object, opposition and reply have sense, only when they really contribute to the 
expansion and exploration of a dialogical space (Nonnon 1996). Taking this contextual-
ization into account, the most expected form of reply is that of integrative reply (Leitao 
2000), as in the example presented in Figure 6. 
E It’s  a bit short maybe  
F It’s OK to be challenged a bit though  
F they should try and put it together  
A You can always kind of  
E Kind of in the end yeah  
A If you’re online  kind of rewind it 
J But but I think that you can’t,  
J you can nearly but not quite follow it   
J Because you’re interested in what’s happening  
J means that the message actually has more impact  
J than if you’re building it up and holding it in your head  
E Yeah true so you can kind of yeah yeah 
 
Fig. 6 Integrative reply  
At this point, it is worth noting that all of the sequences mentioned above are potential 
discursive contexts of an argument-as-product. At least, in this paper, they are treated as 
such. However, we should bear in mind that a sequence can be dialectical without any 
identifiable argumentative structure forming part of it. It is only necessary that once in 
the specific topic-based macro-sequence, some difference of opinion has been implicitly 
or explicitly stated. Or as Willard (1989) puts it, “once we have an argument, anything 
used to communicate within it is germane to an analysis of how the argument proceeds 
and how it affects the arguers” (Willard 1989: 92). 
5. METHOD 
5.1 Research focus 
This paper is based on the assumption that argument structures and sequences are 
strongly related to the “moment” of deliberation in which they appear, and, additionally, 
in a mutual relationship. This means that, on one hand, the deliberation phase will influ-
ence on the type of arguments and argumentation sequences that will appear during the 
phase. As no similar work has been done before, to our knowledge, we cannot proceed 
to specific hypotheses. Nonetheless, in general terms, it is expected that in-middle delib-
eration stages will be the more argumentative and the more relevant to the deliberation 
process than the beginning and ending stages, following on that the pragma-dialectical 
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approach of Critical Discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992) in which Argu-
mentation stage is also in the middle between Confrontation-Opening and Closing. On 
the other hand, following Meyers & Brashers (1999), we also expect that at some mo-
ments individual arguments will be the object of interpersonal argumentation and, sub-
sequently, lead to one or more of the argumentation sequences previously identified, 
changing somehow the deliberation flow of the design episode. More precisely, we are 
interested in the identification of the following relations: 
 Influence of the deliberation stage on the type of argumentation structures 
 Influence of the argumentation structures on the joint deliberation flow 
5.2 Data collection 
The dataset protocol used for this study consists of 9,5 hours (5 meetings) of team design 
transcribed interaction. More precisely, an instructional design team of a well-established 
Distance Education Institution was observed during one year, and their design project 
meetings were video-recorded in an especially equipped meeting room where cameras 
were not visible. Consent was given by each participant. The object of the meetings was 
the creation of a totally on-line, first-appearing, 60-credit course on Design Thinking. The 
focus of the decisions the team members needed to take was not as much on the content of 
the course (this was being authored mostly in a distributed way), but on functional, struc-
tural, and usability aspects, as well as on the team’s own co-ordination. Thus, the main 
character of the meetings was deliberative, with a great need for opinions to be heard, as 
inter-disciplinarity is a desideratum in eLearning design and development. The number of 
participants varied from 6 to 10 per meeting. Their institutional roles were clear, and also 
their assigned general responsibility in relation to the course. 
5.3 Data analysis 
Segmentation. Once the interaction was fully transcribed by fluent native transcribers, 
the protocol was segmented into design sequences. Each design sequence is initiated 
with one of the main Design Space Analysis elements, namely: questions, identifying 
key design issues; options, providing possible answers to the questions; and criteria, for 
assessing and comparing the options (McLean et al. 1991). In deliberative design, these 
elements can be translated into issues, proposals, and assessment, correspondingly. Each 
design sequence is composed of at least one discursive sequence “containing” an issue, a 
proposal, or an assessment. Most of the times, as the context is highly dialogical, a con-
tinuation of the primary sequence with another one is very possible, thus macro-
structures of Issue-Proposal, Proposal-Assessment, and Issue-Assessment   are very fre-
quent. For more than two discursive sequences to form part of the same design se-
quence, which is also frequent as we treat team interaction, it is necessary that: they re-
late to each other in a semantic and pragmatic way; they do not introduce a new or loose-
ly related semantic or pragmatic reality, either through an issue or a proposal.  
 Coding. Three levels of coding of the segmented design sequences are per-
formed as part of our method. First of all, a macro-level coding consists of the “match-
ing” of each one of the design sequences with a pre-defined deliberation phase. To do 
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that, all the sequences belonging to the same topic deliberative episode are put together 
and contrasted with the eight-stage model of deliberation proposed by McBurney et al. 
(2008). Thus, each sequence is labeled with one of the following: Open, Inform, Pro-
pose, Consider, Revise, Recommend, Confirm, Close. The decision on one label or an-
other depends on the team activity performed at each stage. A second-level coding con-
cerns the meso-level of interaction, namely the argumentation sequences, already pre-
sented in Section 4. The following codes-abbreviations are used: EXP, CCO, AVE, 
WEI, OPP, REP. Finally, coding is completed with the micro-level of argument types 
identified in the sequences. These were presented in Section 3. The following codes-
abbreviations are used: pract, posit, negat, expert, alter, person, rule, users, and analo-









 would you prefer it if we were writing into this? 




  CCO 
A I think you would  [C laughs]   
B Ideally  
negati 
B but you’re Mac based and stuff like that 
A Yeah that’s the thing with structured content,    
A it’s more fiddly  
A 
it’s a bit more like kind of laying out a webpage 
with code  
D So this is not Mac friendly? 
A,
B 
No   
D Well that buggers us a bit then [everyone laughs]   
E That’s a big problem.  
rule 
E About 80% of our work is done on Macs. 
B 
Well there are problems with structured content 
anyway,   
assessment 
  
B it IS fiddly,    
B 




but in the Word document it’s like an HTML sort 
of type set up  
  
B and you have tags that rap around stuff    
B and you see those as big tags all over the place    
B and if you miss one out    
B you’ll get a () sign    
B saying you’ve made a mistake,    
B but it’s very easy to kind of mess the document up,  
negati 
B 
especially if you’re using things like track changes 
in there to work out what you’ve done um… 
 
Fig.7 Excerpt from the coded protocol.  
Analysis. For the coded data analysis, qualitative descriptive statistic methods are used, 
to treat the data in ways supporting the research hypotheses presented in section 5.1. 
Apart from common correlations regarding the inter-relation of frequencies, a clusters-
based method is also used. More precisely, each design sequence, namely Issue, Pro-
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posal, or Assessment, as we previously described, is considered as a case, giving a total 
of 254 entrances of design sequences. Each case is then matched with the type(s) of co-
occurring deliberation stage(s) and the type of the emerging argument(s) for each design 
deliberation sequence. At a second level of analysis, we identify the argumentation se-
quences that contextualize the arguments-as-products emerged. Each identified sequence 
is then matched with type and number of design sequences “contained” in it, and also with 
the number of co-occurring deliberation sequences. The main results of our analysis are 
presented below. 
6. RESULTS 
In total, 24 deliberation episodes were identified in 5 design meetings of 2 hours average 
each, i.e. an average of 4,8 decisions per meeting. To begin with, a fair relation among 
design, deliberation, and argumentation was confirmed, as shown in Figure 8. More pre-
cisely, “design sequence” seems to be in a coherent and clearly separated cluster relation 
with “deliberation sequence” and “argument structure” variables. 
 
Fig. 8 Two-cluster analysis of Design sequence, as independent variable,  
and Deliberation sequence and Argumentation, as dependent  
Secondly, the type of deliberation stage appear to be significantly related to the type of 




Table 6. Correlation between Deliberation phase and Argument type 
These correlations focus only on the first appearing argument-as-product in each delib-
eration stage. A deeper exploration into the relation between argument type and delib-
eration stage, seems to support our first hypothesis of more arguments in the middle 
stages of deliberation. As Table 7 shows, “consider” and “revise” stages gather more 
arguments than the other stages. Moreover, a predominance of arguments from positive 
consequences and users-based judgments is clearly observed. 
 













pract 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 5 
posit 0 1 3 2 4 2 0 0 12 
negat 0 0 2 5 1 1 0 0 9 
expert 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
alter 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
person 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 4 
rule 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
users 0 2 1 5 7 1 0 0 16 
analogy 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
alt+negat 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 
alt+posit 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Total 0 4 8 23 16 5 0 0 56 
 
Table 7. Relation among Deliberation Phase and Argument type 
 
Considering, now, argumentation sequences as the main focus of analysis, no concrete 
pattern among deliberation stage and type of argumentation sequence emerges. Begin-
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ning and final stages of deliberation are equally considered as being potentially argu-
mentative as the middle-stages of proposing or considering. This makes us think that 
other discursive characteristics, specific to the issues, proposals, or assessments dis-
cussed, are more crucial for the argumentativeness of a sequence, than its position in the 
interaction flow. Table 8 shows all the argumentation sequences and their characteristics 
in terms of co-occurring design sequences and deliberation stages. 
Sequence Issue Proposal Assessment Deliberation stage 
EXP 1 1 0 inform                                                              
CCO 1 3 3 propose, consider,  
recommend                                        
WEI 0 1 1 propose, consider                                               
EXP 1 0 0 revise                                                              
CCO 0 0 1 inform                                                              
CCO 0 0 1 recommend                                                           
CCO 1 1 0 revise                                                              
WEI 0 1 0 revise                                                              
WEI 0 0 1 propose                                                             
EXP 0 0 1 consider                                                            
EXP 1 1 0 inform                                                              
 
Table 8. Argumentation sequences in relation to  
design sequences and deliberation stages 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Interpreting the results presented above, the following main conclusions are drawn: 
 Deliberation stage influences on the number of the emerging arguments, con-
firming the hypothesis that in-middle deliberation stages (e.g. consider and re-
vise) are more argument-incentive than others 
 On the other hand, argumentation sequences can appear at any deliberation 
stage, thus supporting the hypothesis that specific design and communication 
moves can stimulate argumentative discussion, independently of the group de-
cision-making structure 
In other words, the “deliberation-argument influence” hypothesis seems to be supported 
at the individual level. On the other hand, the “argument-deliberation influence” hypoth-
esis is also supported, at the inter-personal, dialectical level. Nevertheless, the data ana-
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lyzed for the aims of this paper were too few in order to lead to significant generaliza-
tions. The study presented is exploratory, in the sense that it opens paths for future re-
search in the subject of team design deliberation as an emergent and not prescribed pro-
cess. The use of a normative model to do that can facilitate comparison between how 
decisions are supposed to be taken and how they are actually taken by human agents 
working and thinking together. A structural approach of such analysis, as the one pro-
posed, is a potential way of accomplishing this goal, once new coding rules are con-
structed on the basis of human reality. Our future research is oriented towards it. 
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Before raising what I hope will be useful issues and questions to the author, I would like 
to make some preliminary general observations about my reading of Ms. Rapanta’s pa-
per. First, it is only a part of what appears to be a laudably ambitious (and potentially 
very valuable) project, especially for a doctoral dissertation, that links deliberation in the 
context of team design to structures and modalities of argumentation. This portion of the 
project, by itself, is complex, as she attempts to link argumentative type to stages of de-
liberation. Second, I confess that the paper’s topic and methods lie well outside my small 
spheres of expertise—principally in rhetoric and poststructuralist theory, with a strong 
interest in materialism as theorized in both. The consequence of that is surely that I will 
raise some issues that may originate in concerns that seem irrelevant to the design of Ms. 
Rapanta’s goals. I hope that I can locate them, though, in such a way as to render them 
relevant, at least as tertiary concerns, but possibly even limitations of this portion of the 
study that might be important to acknowledge. Although I do see some issues here, I hasten 
to add, third, that I learned a great deal from reading his paper. And for that I am very grateful.  
 I will organize my response around issues of context, power, and presumption—
the latter addressing a fascinating finding of this study that should be underscored for it 
seems to hold a potentially normative value for design deliberation. 
 Context. I raise the troublesome issue of context, not simply because it is a cen-
tral concern of theories of rhetoric, materialism, argument, and poststructuralist theory, 
but because the deliberative discussion data in this essay raise such a profound challenge. 
Ms. Rapanta acknowledges this precisely, in observing that, “given the fact that most of 
these arguments are enthymematic, their classification to one category or another is only 
possible by knowing well the context of design and interaction, in which they took place. 
Still, we consider their exposition as relevant for the need of this paper, even though a 
direct correspondence to the inference templates previously exposed is not always evi-
dent.” Indeed, the correspondence is often not at all evident, and that presents a potential 
problem for the argument of the research project itself. I don’t doubt that there is a corre-
spondence in each case; the issue is rather how difficult it is for a reader who lacks the 
context of the interaction and/or a familiarity with co-design processes to see those con-
nections. It is doubtless an issue that troubles attempts to study any discussion-based ar-
gumentative sequence. It is especially a challenge with an on-going institutionalized 
group, where individual discussants are familiar with working together and thus offer 
highly truncated comments that may seem clear to their co-workers and/or even to re-
searchers familiar with the context, but do not allow the outsider (i.e., the reader) any 
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access for understanding them; this challenge forestalls the ability of a reader to affirm 
the reasonableness of the paper’s claimed correspondences.  
 Please note that I am not objecting to the claims, simply that there is no clear 
way to evaluate many of them, for the deliberative fragments that serve as exemplars 
sometimes do not even seem to the outsider-reader (or at least to me) to be arguments, 
even enthymematic ones. It seems quite possible that this issue might be more readily, 
even easily, addressed in a longer, and more detailed treatment of the discussions that 
serve as the base data. Quite a divide separates researcher from reader here. That may be 
complicated the more by the fact that the co-design team in this study was working on an 
online course that had design as its content, creating a recursivity to the study that also 
influences the legibility of the exemplary argument types and sequences for a reader.   
 Power. This issue, or at least a suggestion of it in the paper, is isolated to a sub-
section on argument types—under “oppositional argumentation,” which addresses the 
issue of dissensus, as raised by a number of researchers as perhaps an end in itself (also 
see, e.g., Rancière, 2010). Ms. Rapanta (2011) addresses this directly, in her claim that 
dissensus as a valued end “is very rarely the case in institutional contexts, especially if 
the goals is clearly collaborative” (2011: 11). She continues by acknowledging that  
there are some cases where difference in perspective is so strong, that . . . the expression of a 
counter-position [is made explicit] towards another party (e.g., the team leader or the “ex-
pert”). Again, as in co-constructive negotiation, such argumentation is not as much based on 
individual interests, but rather on cognitive or disciplinary aspects considered to be conflic-
tive because of epistemic differences. (ibid.) 
Granted that this may be the case, but it seems at least equally plausible that counter-
positions may be expressed for a host of less seemingly impartial reasons than “epistem-
ic” ones; it seems plausible also that even said epistemic differences may be articulated 
tightly with other, far less dispassionate positions, having to do, for example, with status 
or authority differentials in institutional or even informal institutional hierarchies, relative 
valuing of designer- versus user- knowledge, affective residue from prior team projects, 
or other issues of an individual’s motivational matrix and her/his perception of what a 
positive outcome might be. This too, in a sense, is a “context” issue, but it is potentially 
such an important one that it deserves separate mention. Surely, power is always at stake 
in any decision making process in a group or institution, but that is not a reason to bypass 
it here, because it might impinge in quite interesting ways on the specific focus of the 
research questions. If, for example, there are salient within the group issues of authority 
or status, one reason for the development and sequencing of argument types throughout 
the course of decision making might be the perceived “success” of particular types of 
arguments in convincing a member of superior status. This issue may seem to be amelio-
rated by one of the paper’s concluding remarks, specifically that: “The use of a normative 
model … can facilitate comparison between how decisions are supposed to be taken and 
how they are actually taken by human agents working and thinking together” (ibid.: 17). 
But then the question arises: How should decisions in this kind of context be made? It 
seems clear, as Ms. Rapanta points out, that “team design deliberation [is] an emergent 
and not prescribed process,” but that still does not quite get at the problem. If the princi-
pal goal of the co-designers is to produce the product, would it not follow that argument 
types favored by those with more decision-making authority should be preferred? The 
issue is raised at least, if not fully resolved, in Erin Friess’s (2010) essay on rhetorical 
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appeals in design decision making (2010: 435). And its possible significance is raised by 
Willihnganz, Hart, and Willard (2001), in their position that deliberation in which arguers 
approach disagreement with an eye toward predetermined organizationally-accepted solu-
tions, guided by organizational norms, rules, and recipes, rooted in organizational culture ... 
provides the stability that organizational members need—serving to sustain the culture and 
ensure a slow process of change. (2010: 147) 
However, they note as well a different approach that does not work within such taken-for 
granted assumptions “that may create novel, unique, or unprecedented solutions” (p. 
147). They seem to have a strong preference for the latter; it is unclear whether such out-
comes would be highly valued in the context Ms. Rapanta’s paper takes up. But it is an 
interesting, potentially crucial, question.  
 Finally, presumption. I have already addressed issues of presumption indirectly 
in discussing power, particularly impinging on a presumption of trust in expertise, a con-
sideration that Shawn Batt (2007) has taken up in important ways. But there is more to it 
even than that. Early in the paper, and at a more general level than particular presump-
tions, Ms. Rapanta suggests the following: 
As the goal of this paper is not to evaluate argumentation sequences but just to identify them, 
we will not enter into … [among others] questions regarding the burden of proof … . Our 
analysis will be limited to what types of argument sequences are possible or expected to 
emerge during a design deliberation episode. (2011: 8)  
At the outset, I would suggest that issues regarding burden of proof and presumption do 
suggest possibilities and expectations for argument sequences. And it seems fair to sug-
gest that that should be acknowledged in this study. 
 Indeed, there is a strong presumption at work, according to the results of this 
study, and this is, to my mind, one of its most important contributions to an understand-
ing of how design deliberation does work, and very likely how it should work argumenta-
tively.  By far, the two most frequently used argument types that emerged here were ar-
guments from positive consequence and inferences from user-based judgments (p. 16). 
Although it is not completely clear to me how to separate these two categories cleanly, 
since positive consequence would seem to imply positive outcomes for users, there still 
seems a clear and important message here: that the positive experience of the end user of 
the product is the principal presumption, which I would regard as a descriptive finding 
that might also a strongly normative expectation, at least in the case of this group of co-
designers, but also perhaps beyond this group.  
 Thank you again for the opportunity to read this paper. My sincere compliments 
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